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354 abstract
This paper analyzes fiscal convergence and sustainability in the European Union 
using data on government debt, revenues, and expenditures. Absolute fiscal diver-
gence is present in the EU, especially after the sovereign debt crisis. However, we 
find evidence of fiscal club convergence when clubs are endogenously determined. 
Club convergence is important for the EU because there is no single fiscal policy 
and member states’ policies are heterogeneous. Endogenous clubs do not share 
the usual geographical, political, or development similarities. Fiscal policy in the 
EU is found to be unsustainable, but it is countercyclical. We use a policy response 
function where the primary surplus is a function of public debt and the output gap. 
The primary surplus does not respond to changes in public debt, and this is con-
sidered to be unsustainable. However, it increases in expansions and decreases in 
recessions thus being countercyclical. The countercyclical primary surplus is 
important for smoothing business cycles. 
Keywords: convergence clubs, fiscal sustainability, public debt, structural breaks, 
log t test, dynamic panel
1 IntroductIon
With the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, fiscal policy has become an 
increasingly important topic. The sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession 
led to many European Union countries breaching the public debt and deficit goals 
set by Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The goals are for public debt not to exceed 
60% of GDP and for the deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP. These goals, which are 
part of the nominal convergence criteria, were established to ensure sound and 
sustainable public finances in the European Union. However, whether or not there 
is a convergence of member states’ fiscal policies and whether fiscal policy is 
sustainable is still an open question. 
This paper analyzes fiscal convergence and tests for fiscal sustainability in the 
European Union. We test fiscal convergence directly using government revenue, 
expenditure, and debt as key government variables instead of testing for GDP 
convergence as is usual in the convergence literature. The paper considers both 
absolute convergence and convergence clubs, which is important because the 
European Union does not have a single fiscal policy and member states’ policies 
are heterogeneous. Heterogeneous fiscal policies among member states could 
easily lead to different fiscal convergence clubs, which are analyzed in the paper. 
Based on the identified convergence clubs, we test for fiscal sustainability in the 
clubs as well as in the whole of the European Union. Fiscal sustainability has 
become an especially important topic for the EU countries after the Greek crisis. 
The literature on fiscal convergence is relatively scarce. Economic integration, 
common institutional factors, and common policies in the EU should lead to con-
vergence in key fiscal indicators. On the other hand, the sovereign debt crisis and 
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355fiscal divergence. It seems that the observed period plays an important role. Earlier 
research finds some evidence of fiscal convergence in the period from the late 
1960s to the early 2000s (De Bandt and Mongelli, 2000; and Delgado, 2006), 
while more recent studies such as Kočenda, Kutan and Yigit (2008) show the lack 
of it in the period from 1995 to 2005. The mentioned papers measure convergence 
using the popular β- and α-convergence tests as well as cointegration tests in a 
time series framework. 
The literature does not tackle the issue of convergence clubs regarding fiscal pol-
icy. However, the idea of convergence clubs is implicitly included in discussions 
on the EU core and periphery, or on the two-speed Europe idea popularized by 
Blanchard (2010) which argues that different groups of European countries show 
faster and slower recoveries after the Great Recession. Accordingly, fiscal conver-
gence and the possibility of convergence clubs are important issues for EU poli-
cymakers. This paper analyzes both absolute convergence and club convergence. 
Instead of grouping countries according to ad-hoc criteria such as geographical 
location or EU accession date, we determine convergence clubs endogenously. 
We also analyze fiscal sustainability within the clubs and in the whole EU 28 
using a policy response function proposed by Bohn (1998, 2007). Fiscal policy is 
sustainable if the primary government surplus increases as a response to the 
increase in public debt. This is considered responsible and sustainable behavior 
because the government increases its revenue or decreases spending when faced 
with a higher public debt. Bohn (1998, 2005) concludes that U.S. fiscal policy is 
sustainable. Cassou, Shadmani and Vázquez (2017) refine this finding by showing 
that the U.S. fiscal policy is sustainable only during good economic times, but not 
in times of economic distress. 
The research regarding European fiscal policy is somewhat different. Collignon 
(2012) develops a policy response function to analyze European fiscal sustainabil-
ity. His policy response function is adjusted to EU fiscal rules looking at the pri-
mary surplus response to changes in debt and deficit. Results indicate that Euro-
pean fiscal policy is sustainable in this respect, but conditions on financial markets 
and the risk of financial contagion can make it insufficient, as shown by the Greek 
crisis. Research has also focused on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. The 
common understanding is that fiscal policy should be countercyclical; higher gov-
ernment spending in recessions followed by fiscal consolidation in expansions to 
smooth business cycles. The countercyclical fiscal policy is sustainable in the long 
run when extra deficits accumulated in recessions are compensated for during 
times of economic growth. Balassone, Francese and Zotteri (2010) show that 
budget balance in fourteen EU countries deteriorates during recessions, but does 
not improve to the same extent during expansions. Government expenditures are 
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356 Public debt sustainability has been widely analyzed for individual countries as 
well. Babić (2003) and Mihaljek (2003) analyze the sustainability of public and 
external debt in Croatia. This early analysis1 concluded that Croatian public debt 
is not too sensitive to the various shocks analyzed, but credit rating and interest 
rate spread in Croatia are worse than those of central European countries. Deskar-
Škrbić and Šimović (2017) on the other hand showed that public debt level affects 
the effectiveness of fiscal spending by reducing the size of fiscal effects in Croatia. 
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing absolute fiscal convergence 
and convergence clubs using quarterly data for government debt, revenues, and 
expenditures in EU member states from 2000:1 to 2017:2. We test convergence 
using a log t test proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) accompanied with the 
clustering algorithm for endogenous club classification. Commonly used β- and 
σ-convergence tests might be biased and suffer from low power as noted in Ber-
nard and Durlauf (1995, 1996) among others. Such tests assume linear dynamics 
in the convergence process. Phillips and Sul’s (2007) log t test is based on a non-
linear dynamic factor model, which allows a nonlinear adjustment in parameters 
both over time and across different countries. Therefore, it is suitable in testing for 
convergence. We check the robustness of our results by applying recently devel-
oped unit root tests, which control for both sharp and smooth structural breaks. 
The paper also contributes to the fiscal policy sustainability literature. We use a 
policy response function proposed by Bohn (1998) in a panel framework where 
the primary government surplus is a function of public debt and the output gap. 
We use a dynamic panel model and include a lagged dependent variable in the 
equation since there is a strong inter-temporal relationship between the govern-
ment surplus and public debt. Furthermore, EU countries are somewhat homoge-
nous, and therefore there is a possibility of cross-sectional dependence. Unlike the 
previous literature, we use a dynamic panel system GMM estimator with common 
correlated effects proposed by Pesaran (2006) which controls for pronounced 
homogeneity among the EU countries. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. There is strong and robust evi-
dence of absolute divergence in government debt, revenues, and expenditures 
among the EU countries. The process of divergence was intensified during the 
sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession. However, we find two, three, and 
four endogenous convergence clubs in government debt, revenue, and expendi-
tures respectively. The clubs are found to be quite heterogeneous; club members 
do not share the usual geographical, political, or development similarities. On the 
other hand, groups of EU-15 and EU-13 countries as well as EU core and EU 
periphery countries are shown to diverge, which suggests an important difference 
between endogenous and exogenous groupings.
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357Fiscal policy is found to be unsustainable but countercyclical both in the EU as a 
whole and within identified convergence clubs. Our model does not show an 
increase in the primary surplus after debt upsurge, which is identified as unsus-
tainable behavior. We find only limited evidence of fiscal sustainability in the 
EU-13 group and in a subsample with public debt higher than 90%. On the other 
hand, fiscal policy in the EU is countercyclical, indicating the efforts of fiscal 
policy to smooth business cycles.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains and presents the data. It 
describes empirical methods used in the paper, namely log t test and the clustering 
algorithm for club convergence analysis; unit root tests with structural breaks; and 
the dynamic panel model used for the sustainability analysis. Section 3 presents 
results on fiscal convergence and sustainability, while section 4 concludes.
2 data and methodology
2.1 data
For convergence analysis, we use quarterly general government debt, revenues, 
and expenditures in a percent of GDP as our key variables. Variables in current 
prices are divided by nominal GDP and expressed in real terms as a percent of 
GDP. The data span from 2000:q1 to 2017:q2, which is the longest available 
period for a balanced panel for 28 EU countries. For the sustainability analysis, 
we use primary surplus, public debt, and the output gap data, but the sample starts 
in 2002:q1 because of the availability of primary surplus data. The primary sur-
plus is calculated as total surplus plus payable interest, and it is expressed as a 
percent of GDP. Public debt is expressed as a percent of GDP as well. The output 
gap is a percent deviation of GDP from its long-run trend computed using the 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. 
All variables are seasonally adjusted using Census X11 method for Census 
Bureau’s X12-ARIMA program. Data are collected primarily from the Eurostat 
and International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. For Croatia, we use central 
government revenues and expenditures provided by the Croatian National Bank 
as a proxy for general government. For some countries, we had to reconstruct data 
from different sources to work with balanced panels for the analysis. Details on 
data construction are explained in appendix. Appendix also plots series of govern-
ment debt, revenues, expenditures, and primary surplus as a percent of GDP and 
presents basic descriptive statistics.
2.2 the log t conVergence test and club conVergence
We use the log t test for convergence analysis of government debt, revenues, and 
expenditures as well as for analysis of convergence clubs. The test was developed 
by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) who built on a neoclassical growth model with 
heterogeneous technology and looked for the output convergence. Intuitively, the 
test looks at cross-sectional dispersion over time. If the dispersion decays over 
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358 Sul (2009) introduced three sets of tools: relative transition curves, log t test, and 
the clustering algorithm for testing club convergence.
Allowing for a heterogeneous technology in a growth model is important because 
countries experience different growth paths. Such a framework is reasonable for 
studying fiscal convergence in the EU as well because countries have both a com-
mon part, such as institutions and policies, and an idiosyncratic part which is 
country-specific. 
Consider a neoclassical growth model with the heterogeneous technology used in 




 is output per capita, ỹi0 and ỹi
* are initial and steady-state levels of output 
per capita, respectively, and Ai0 represents the initial level of technology. Hetero-
geneity is allowed through the convergence parameter β
it
 and the output growth 
rate g
it
 since both can vary over time and across countries. The model can be 
rewritten to show a common and country-specific component. We simplify the 






 t where the term a
it
 collects all RHS variables except 
g
it 
t. Than the model can be written as a dynamic factor model:
  (2)
In this dynamic factor model μ
t
 is a common component. The coefficient b
it
 explains 
how individual countries relate to the common component μ
t
. In this paper, the 
focus is on fiscal convergence. Instead of looking at output per capita, we consider 
convergence in government debt, revenues, and expenditures. The common com-
ponent μ
t
 in that case are EU institutions, integration process, and/or common 
policies, while b
it
 represents a share of a common trend for each EU member state. 
Coefficients b
it
 could be empirically analyzed using relative transition curves h
it
 




 are series on government debt, revenue, or expenditures.2 We remove the 
cyclical component from the time series as suggested by Phillips and Sul (2009) 
by using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, but the results are not very sensi-
tive to cyclical smoothing. Convergence is evident when h
it
 curves for all coun-
tries approach 1.
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359The log t test is a more formal way for testing convergence. The test builds on 
relative transition curves and has the following form:
  (4)
where  is a quadratic distance measure which goes to 0 
when countries converge. t = T
0 
, ..., T where T
0
 is the first observation after we 
discard the initial 30% of observations, as suggested by Phillips and Sul (2009). 
Second term on LHS is a penalty function which improves test performance, and 
u
t
 is an iid error. Convergence is tested with the coefficient γ. When γ is negative 
and statistically significant, we can conclude that countries diverge. If 0  ≤  γ  <  2 
we can conclude there is a conditional convergence in growth rates. For absolute 
convergence to hold, γ  ≥  2.3 The critical value at 5% level significance is 1.65. 
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) also developed a clustering algorithm for detecting 
endogenous convergence clubs based on the log t regression. If the convergence 
hypothesis is rejected for the full sample, club convergence can be considered. 
The clustering algorithm has four steps. Simplified, in the first step we sort coun-
tries in the panel, and in the second step, we form a core group of k countries, 
where k  <  N, for which the log t regression yields the highest t-statistics.4 The 
remaining N  –  k countries form a complementary group. In the third step we add 
one country at the time from the complementary to the core group and for each we 
apply the log t test. If t  >  -1.65, the new country is added to the core group. The 
first convergence club is obtained after all countries that satisfy the condition are 
added. In the fourth step, we apply the log t test on the group of remaining coun-
tries which are not a part of the first convergence club. If the t-statistic is greater 
than -1.65, the second convergence club is identified. If not, we repeat steps (1) to 
(3) on the group of remaining countries to identify other possible convergence clubs.
To obtain as few clubs as possible, we run separate tests for club merging. Once 
initial clubs are identified, we run the log t test on them. If convergence hypothesis 
is not rejected for club 1 and club 2, we merge them and form a new club 1. New 
club 1 is then tested for merging with club 3 and so on. The advantage of this 
procedure is that it produces fewer convergence clubs, but the downside is that the 
evidence for convergence is less convincing, because the t-statistic on the γ coef-
ficient is usually insignificant.
2.3 unIt root tests for conVergence
We use different unit root tests for convergence analysis within identified clubs to 
check the robustness of our results. We test for convergence in government debt, 
revenues, and expenditures both in the full sample of EU 28 and in each identified 
convergence club. Following the approach of Bernard and Durlauf (1995) and 
3 Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) provide more technical details of the test. For empirical analysis we use a set 
of procedures described in Du (2017).
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360 Pesaran (2007) we compute a difference between country i and the average which 










 represents government debt, revenues, or expenditures in country i, and 
x̄
t
 is an adjusted average excluding country i under consideration. The adjusted 
average should prevent a bias in testing, which could be large for big countries 
such as Germany. 
If the difference series x͂
it
 is stationary, then there is convergence in government 
debt, revenues, or expenditures. Shocks to an individual country’s fiscal variables 
may be permanent or temporary, but all shocks to the difference series x͂
it
 should 
be only temporary if country i converges to the average. Rejection of unit root is 
evidence of convergence. If our results are robust, rejections should be higher 
within identified clubs than in the full sample of EU 28.
We apply unit root tests developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003), and Enders and 
Lee (2012) that can control for structural breaks. Structural breaks are highly pos-
sible in government debt, revenues, and expenditures time series since they 
include the period of the sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession in the EU. 
Ignoring structural breaks might be a serious problem that reduces the power of 
the test, as argued in Perron (1989). We also present results of a standard ADF test, 
which does not control for structural breaks. Intuitively, structural breaks are 
abrupt changes in the data such as the Great Recession. It is possible that the con-
vergence was present both before and after the break, but the existence of the 
break violates our conclusions. 
The Lee and Strazicich (2003) unit root test controls for two sharp breaks in the 
data. It is a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test with the equation:
 ∆ x͂
t
 = δʹ∆ Z
t
 + ϕ S͂
t–1 + εt (6)
where S͂
t
 is a detrended x͂
t
 series and ϕ is a coefficient of interest. Under the null 
hypothesis of unit root ϕ  =  0, and the rejection of unit root implies convergence. 
We use the so-called break model which allows for two breaks in both level and 
the trend of the series using dummy variable vector Z
t
 = [1, t, D1t, D2t, DT1t, DT2t]. 
Dummy variables D1t and D2t control for breaks in level and take value 1 if 
t  ≥  TBj + 1 and 0 otherwise for breaks j = 1, 2 where TBj are break locations. On the 
other hand, dummy variables DT1t and DT2t control for breaks in the trend where 
DT
jt
  =  t – TBj for t  ≥  TBj + 1 and 0 otherwise for breaks j = 1, 2. Break locations TB1 
and TB2 are endogenously determined in a grid search which minimizes the t-sta-
tistics of coefficient ϕ. 
Critical values for the LM test with two breaks in a level and the trend are taken 
from table 2 of Lee and Strazicich (2003). Number of lags in the equation (6) is 
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361We also use the Enders and Lee (2012) unit root test, which controls for an 
unknown number of smooth structural transitions approximated by a flexible Fou-
rier function. The Fourier function has proved to accommodate smooth breaks 
very well, there is no need for a grid search as in Lee and Strazicich (2003) test, 
and the number of estimated parameters is relatively small, so the test does not 
lose power. The test equation is simple and can be estimated by OLS:
 ∆ x͂
t







 is detrended x͂
t
 series and ϕ is a coefficient of interest. The null 
hypothesis of unit root assumes ϕ  =  0, and again a rejection of unit root implies 
convergence. However, equation (7) includes a time-dependent deterministic term 




, c1, and c2 are coefficients estimated by OLS, t is a current time period, 
and T is a number of observations. Note that the equation (8) nests a standard 
linear specification when c1 and c2 are equal to zero. We run the model with a sin-
gle frequency equal to one, and with a number of lags chosen by general to spe-
cific procedure. Critical values are taken from Enders and Lee (2012) table 1.
2.4 PolIcy resPonse functIon for the sustaInabIlIty analysIs
We analyze fiscal policy sustainability using a policy response function as sug-
gested by Bohn (1998, 2007).5 Our model can be written as:
 s
it
 = ρ s
it–1 + β1 dit + β2  y͂it + εit . (9)
Equation (9) is a dynamic panel version of Bohn’s policy response function where 
s
it
 is the government primary surplus in country i at time t, d
it
 is public debt, and y͂
it
 
is the output gap. e
it






, and αi are country fixed effects. 
The error term ε
it
 is independent, or E[ε
it 
εjk] = 0 for each i, j, t, and k where i ≠ j. 
Fiscal policy is sustainable when β1 is positive, suggesting an increase in primary 
surplus as a response to higher public debt. Such behavior is considered sustain-
able and responsible, because the government tends to increase its revenue or 
decrease spending as a response to higher debt. 
Bohn (1998) stressed the importance of controlling the model with the output gap. 
Coefficient β
2
 next to the output gap also tells us if the fiscal policy is pro- or 
countercyclical. When β
2
 <  0, the positive output gap decreases government sur-
5 Bohn (2005, 2007) criticize fiscal sustainability analysis based on unit root and cointegration techniques 
popularized by Trehan and Walsh (1988), and Hamilton and Flavin (1986). He argues that such techniques are 
not capable of rejecting sustainability hypothesis because the relevant debt variables are necessary stationary 
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362 plus and fiscal policy can be considered as procyclical and vice versa (Balassone, 
Francese and Zotteri, 2010).
Our model includes a richer dynamic than initially proposed in Bohn (1998) by 
including a lagged primary surplus (Cassou, Shadmani and Vázquez, 2017). This 
specification is more appropriate because it allows for fiscal policy persistence 
and because of a possible feedback effect between public debt and surplus in a 
panel framework; accumulated government deficits (negative surpluses) are closely 
related to public debt. 
The benchmark model is estimated by a system GMM augmented with common 
correlated effects (CCE) proposed by Pesaran (2006) to deal with cross-sectional 
dependence. The system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) is often used for dynamic panel estimation, and we 
use their two-step procedure with robust standard errors where fixed effects are 
removed by first differencing.6 
Our panel consists of European Union countries which are somewhat homoge-
nous in terms of common institutions and policies, and therefore a cross-sectional 
dependence can be an important issue affecting our results.7 To deal with the issue 
of cross-sectional dependence, we augment the system GMM estimator by adding 
cross-sectional means of all variables as instruments in the model from the equa-
tion (9). Common correlated effects procedure is proposed by Pesaran (2006) for 
a group of OLS estimators. However, we use this principle to augment system 
GMM estimator. Pesaran (2006) showed that adding CCE has satisfactory small 
sample properties for relatively small N and T even in heterogeneous models. We 
call this model system GMM-CCE model. 
We confirm the robustness of the benchmark model by estimating a dynamic 
panel model with fixed effects (FE) using robust errors. Our data set is a balanced 
panel with a reasonably large T = 62 and therefore the FE estimator should not be 
biased. We refer to this model simply as the FE model. 
3 fIscal conVergence and sustaInabIlIty
3.1 conVergence clubs
We do not find any evidence to support the absolute convergence of government 
debt, revenues, and expenditures in the EU using relative transition curves and log 
t test. The relative transition curves in figure 1 show lack of convergence, because 
they do not approach 1 in the observed period. By contrast, curves are scattered 
equally at the beginning and the end of the sample. 
6 We use first differencing instead of forward orthogonal deviaton (FOD) because our data set is a balanced 
panel. Refer to Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) for complete technical details.
7 Indeed, when we apply Pesaran (2015) test for weak cross-sectional dependence to the model, the null hypoth-
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363Figure 1
Relative transition paths
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Transition paths for government expenditures
This is further supported by a more formal log t test presented in table 1. Table 1 
shows γ coefficient from the log t regression applied to government debt (1a), rev-
enues (1b), and expenditures (1c) data. Again, γ < 0 implies divergence, 0 ≤ γ < 2 
is evidence of conditional convergence, and γ ≥ 2 implies absolute convergence in 
levels. Table 1 shows that γ coefficient is significantly negative (marked with an 
asterisk) when log t test is applied to all EU countries, which rejects absolute con-
vergence of government debt, revenues, and expenditures. Kočenda, Kutan and 
Yigit (2008) also find fiscal divergence in a form of pronounced level of heteroge-
neity in public debt and deficit among EU member states. 
We also find that the Great Recession and sovereign debt crisis further increased 
fiscal divergence in the EU. In figure 2 we show results of estimated rolling win-
dow γ coefficient for government debt, revenues, and expenditures. We estimate 
the log t regression with a centered rolling window of 20 quarters (five years) 
together with 95% confidence intervals. For all three variables, estimates are sig-
nificantly negative throughout the observed period, which further confirms the 
result of fiscal divergence. An interesting finding is that the estimated γ further 
decreases from 2008 in the case of government revenues and expenditures and 
from 2011 in the case of government debt. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
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364 Table 1
log t convergence test results and convergence clubs classification
(a) government debt convergence results
log(t) All countries
γ   -0.253*
t-stat -22.13
Club classification
log(t) Club 1 [19] Club 2 [9]
γ   -0.00900 0.560
t-stat -0.686 6.100
(b) government revenues convergence results
log(t) All countries
γ   -0.729*
t-stat -33.34
Club classification
log(t) Club 1 [19] Club 2 [5] Club 3 [2] Club 4 [2]
γ   0.00700 0.792 0.114 -3.378*
t-stat 0.527 22.75 0.395 -2.779
(c) government expenditures convergence results
log(t) All countries
γ   -1.075*
t-stat -10.68
Club classification
log(t) Club 1 [5] Club 2 [11] Club 3 [6] Club 4 [3] Club 5 [2]
γ 0.284   0.264 0.113 0.851 -0.125
t-stat 1.016 16.05 8.963 9.936 -0.154
Final classification
log(t) Club 1 [5] Club 2 [11] Club 3 [9] Club 4 [2]
γ 0.284   0.264   0.169 -0.125
t-stat 1.016 16.05 14.93 -0.154
Note: The table presents γ coefficient from log t regression together with t-statistics. 
* Marks a rejection of convergence at 5% level. Numbers in brackets are number of countries in 
the club. Club classification is a result of the initial clustering algorithm. Final classification is 
a result after club merging. Final classification is presented only when club merging is signifi-
cant. Countries that form different clubs are presented in figure 3. 
However, we find strong evidence of club convergence. Convergence clubs are 
implicitly included in discussions about the EU core and periphery as well as in 
the idea of two-speed recovery in Europe popularized by Blanchard (2010). We 
use the clustering algorithm of Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) to determine conver-
gence clubs endogenously. Results are presented in table 1 under Club classifica-
tion section. Countries that form convergence clubs are shown in figure 3.
Table 1a presents results for government debt. We find two convergence clubs, 
one containing 19 and the other 9 countries. The γ coefficient is statistically zero 
in the first, and positive, but less than 2 in the second club, which indicates condi-
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365gence clubs emerged and club sizes are 19, 5, and 3 (table 1b). Ireland and Roma-
nia form a divergence group, since they do not converge to any club. For govern-
ment expenditures, club classification finds five clubs in total, plus Ireland as a 
divergent group. However, clubs 3 and 4 can be merged together according to log 
t test, so the final classification shows four convergence clubs plus Ireland (table 
1c). Club sizes are 5, 11, 9, and 2 for Clubs 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. In each case 
0 ≤ γ < 2 indicating conditional convergence. 
Figure 2
Rolling window estimation of log t regression
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log t coefficient
Identified clubs are heterogeneous in a sense that countries within a club do not 
share common geographical, political, or development similarities. In figure 3 we 
show countries that form different clubs. The first row of figure 3 shows clubs 
from 1 to 4 and divergent groups. The first column indicates fiscal variables: gov-
ernment debt, revenues, and expenditures. Convergence clubs are in squares, 
while divergent groups are in circles. For example, government debt Club 1 
includes Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia, which are new member states, mostly small countries, and most of them 
experienced the transition from centrally planned to market economy. However, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and the UK are also members of the same club (government debt Club 1). 





























































































   
 














































Note: Convergence clubs are in squares, non-convergent groups are in circles. 
We find a substantial degree of homogeneity in government debt, revenues, and 
expenditures clubs. For example, government debt Club 1 and government reve-
nues Club 1 share 12 of 19 countries (figure 3). All eleven countries in govern-
ment expenditures Club 2 are also in government debt Club 1. There is a major 
overlap between government debt Club 2 and government expenditures Club 3. 
Other similarities can also be observed in figure 3. Therefore, clubs are heteroge-
neous within countries, but homogenous in fiscal variables. 
Endogenously identified clubs indeed show evidence of convergence, but this is 
not the case for ad-hoc exogenous clubs. First, we group countries into EU-15 and 
EU-13 and apply the log t regression to government debt, revenues, and expendi-
tures data. The results reject convergence in all cases except for government debt 
in EU-13, where the γ coefficient is statistically equal to zero (0.042 with a t-sta-
tistic of 1.34). Next, we group countries into EU core and periphery8 and use the 
log t test. Convergence is strongly rejected in both groups for all three fiscal vari-
ables. It seems that countries converge to some criteria other than simply geo-
graphical, political, or development similarities, or indeed multiple similarities.9 
These results could be compared with Kočenda, Kutan and Yigit (2008) who ana-
lyze fiscal convergence in the ten EU countries that joined EU in 2004. They do 
not find a systematic difference among all EU countries, EU core, and EU periph-
ery when analyzing fiscal convergence. Delgado (2006) uses cluster analysis to 
group EU countries thus avoiding ad-hoc exogenous clubs, but the paper does not 
tackle the issue of fiscal club convergence.
8 EU core countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and UK. Other 18 countries form EU periphery.
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367The log t regression improves upon the standard β-convergence tests, but results are 
compatible with such tests. In figure 4 we show a simple scatter plot of government 
debt level and a growth rate, which is a version of an unconditional β-convergence 
test. For government debt Clubs 1 and 2, we estimate the equation of the form 
log (dTi /d1i) = α + β d1i + εi, where the dependent variable is the debt growth rate 
between the last and the first period, and the independent variable is a debt level in 
the first period. Club 1 is depicted with black circles, and Club 2 with grey pluses. 
As shown in the figure 4, regression lines for each club are negatively sloped indi-
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Beta convergence among clubs
3.2 unIt root tests of fIscal conVergence
Table 2 presents results of fiscal convergence using unit root tests for the sample 
of 28 EU countries and within clubs identified by the clustering algorithm. For the 
government debt data, we analyze convergence to the average for the full sample 
of the EU 28, then for the 19 countries of convergence club 1, and then for the 9 
countries of club 2 (table 2a). A similar analysis is done for government revenues 
and expenditure in table 2b and 2c, respectively. For each club, we compute a 
separate adjusted average. Unit root rejection rates at 10% significance level are 
presented for ADF, Lee and Strazicich (2003), and Enders and Lee (2012) test. 
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368 Table 2
Club convergence using unit root tests
2a: Percent of countries converging to the average gov. debt (%)
adf lee & strazicich enders & lee
EU [28]   3.57   3.57   7.14
Club 1 [19]   0.00   5.26   5.26
Club 2 [9]  22.22   0.00   0.00
2b: Percent of countries converging to the average gov. revenues (%)
adf lee & strazicich enders & lee
EU [28]  35.71  85.71  46.43
Club 1 [19]  42.11  94.74  57.89
Club 2 [5]  40.00 100.00  40.00
Club 3 [2]   0.00 100.00 100.00
2c: Percent of countries converging to the average gov. expenditures (%)
adf lee & strazicich enders & lee
EU [28]  39.29  78.57  46.43
Club 1 [5]  40.00 100.00  40.00
Club 2 [11]  54.55  90.91  81.81
Club 3 [9]  33.33  77.78  55.56
Club 4 [2] 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Rejection rates of unit root hypothesis at 10% level of significance are reported in the table. 
Number of countries in a club is in brackets. The rejection rate is calculated as (# of rejections/ 
# of countries within a club)×100. 
We find neither absolute nor club convergence in government debt data because 
the difference of government debt against the average is stationary for just a few 
countries. For the full sample of EU 28, unit root rejection rates are only 3.5% in 
the case of ADF and the Lee and Strazicich test, and 7% for the Enders and Lee 
test. Rejection rates within two clubs are not much different, thus not supporting 
club convergence of government debt. 
In the case of government revenues and expenditures, we do not find evidence of 
absolute convergence, but club convergence is supported. Almost half of countries 
in the EU 28 sample converge to the average. ADF test has low power in the pres-
ence of structural breaks, but the unit root is rejected in 35% to 40% of countries 
for both series. The Enders and Lee test has more power and rejects the unit root 
in 46% of countries. Finally, the Lee and Strazicich test with sharp structural 
breaks shows the biggest rejection rates of 78% and 85%. For both government 
revenues and expenditures, rejection rates within clubs are higher than in the full 
sample of EU 28, indicating stronger convergence within clubs. This is especially 
true for Lee and Strazicich (2003) test where rejection rates are mostly over 90% 
within clubs indicating strong club convergence. Enders and Lee (2012) test has 
rejection rates within clubs well over 50%, except in government revenues club 2 
and government expenditures club 1. ADF test gives somewhat mixed results but 
does not reject the club convergence hypothesis. This confirms that convergence 
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369except for government debt. As a comparison, De Bandt and Mongelli (2000) use 
cointegration techniques to analyze fiscal convergence in the Eurozone. Their 
findings support fiscal convergence in the Eurozone over the 1970-1998 period. 
Unit root tests which allow for nonlinearities have recently been a more popular 
way of analyzing convergence (see Raguž Krištić, Rogić Dumančić and Arčabić 
(2018) and references therein).
3.3 fIscal (un)sustaInabIlIty
Next, we analyze if fiscal policy is sustainable in the European Union and within 
convergence clubs found in the previous section. In this respect, we use the policy 
response function from equation (9) which relates primary government surplus 
with public debt and the output gap. If surplus increases as a response to an 
increase in public debt, fiscal policy is considered sustainable, as discussed in the 
methodology section. 
We analyze fiscal sustainability using seven different models (subsamples). Model 
1 is the benchmark model, which includes 28 EU countries. Models 2 and 3 
include subsamples of countries from government debt convergence clubs identi-
fied in the previous section. The first club consists of 19, and the second of 9 
countries.10 Next, we consider fiscal policy sustainability within exogenous clubs 
of EU-15 and EU-13 countries with Models 4 and 5. Finally, Models 6 and 7 use 
subsamples with government debt ≥ 90% (Model 6) and debt < 90% of GDP 
(Model 7). This subsample analysis is motivated by the influential paper of Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2010) who argue that a public debt higher than 90% of GDP 
depresses economic growth. Maastricht criteria also require government debt 
below 60% of GDP. However, EU countries fought with the Great Recession and 
the sovereign debt crisis, which substantially increased the level of public debt in 
some countries. Our data show that 15 out of 28 EU countries had a government 
debt higher than 60% of GDP in 2017:Q2. Therefore, such subsample analysis is 
interesting from both an academic and a policy perspective. The 90% level of 
public debt can be considered as arbitrary, especially since Arčabić et al. (2018) 
show there is no single level of public debt associated with the decrease of GDP 
growth. However, in this paper, we are only interested in fiscal sustainability. 
Fiscal policy is found to be unsustainable in the EU. We present the results of 
system GMM-CCE and FE estimators in tables 3 and 4, respectively. Different 
models are numbered in the first row of each table, and independent variables are 
in the first column. In table 3, the estimated coefficient β1 next to the government 
debt is negative or insignificant. In other words, the government does not increase 
primary surplus as a response of higher government debt, and fiscal policy is not 
sustainable. We find weak evidence of fiscal sustainability for the EU-13 group 
countries and for the subsample with debt ≥ 90%. For these two models (Models 
10 We consider government debt convergence clubs only, but clubs are fairly homogeneous between fiscal 
variables, as discussed. In addition, some government revenues and expenditures convergence clubs include 
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370 5 and 6), point estimates are positive with both system GMM-CCE and FE estima-
tor. However, coefficients are insignificant for system GMM-CCE estimator, and 
point estimates are small in magnitude in both cases (tables 3 and 4). 
Fiscal policy is countercyclical in the EU and in all subsamples considered. Balas-
sone, Francese and Zotteri (2010), and Cassou, Shadmani and Vázquez (2017) use 
β
2
 coefficient next to the output gap to analyze cyclicality of fiscal policy. As pre-
sented in tables 3 and 4, the coefficient next to output gap is positive and statisti-
cally significant in all models.11 Positive output gaps are related to an increase in 
primary surplus, which can be interpreted as a countercyclical fiscal policy. This 
indicates that fiscal policy in the European Union tries to smooth business cycles.
Fiscal policy is fairly persistent because the coefficient ρ next to the lagged sur-
plus is positive, statistically significant, and roughly 0.5. 
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3734 conclusIon
The Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone have shaken 
fiscal policies in the EU. Many European countries have breached public debt and 
deficit goals set by the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore, the issue of fiscal 
policy convergence and sustainability is very important for the EU.
This paper analyzes fiscal policy convergence and tests for fiscal sustainability in 
28 EU countries using data on government debt, revenues, and expenditures. We 
show absolute divergence in fiscal policies, which was further increased by the 
Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis. However, we find strong evidence 
of club convergence. Club convergence is important to consider because the EU 
does not have a single fiscal policy and member state policies are heterogeneous. 
In general, convergence clubs are implicitly included in discussions on the EU 
core and periphery, and in the two-speed recovery idea which argues that different 
groups (or clubs) of European countries are characterized by faster and slower 
recoveries from the recession. We find two government debt convergence clubs, 
three government revenue clubs, and four government expenditure clubs. Endog-
enously identified clubs do not have simple geographical, political, or development 
similarities. They are heterogeneous within countries, but homogenous between 
fiscal variables. Exogenous grouping of EU countries into EU-15 and EU-13 or 
into EU core and periphery does not show evidence of fiscal convergence. Conver-
gence clubs are related to multiple equilibriums within the EU, which makes a 
single fiscal policy difficult to achieve. More precise fiscal rules could be consid-
ered by policymakers together with corrective measures such as the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. Fiscal rules instead of discretionary decision making might be a 
step toward similar fiscal policies and fiscal convergence in the EU.
Fiscal policy in the EU is found to be unsustainable, but countercyclical. We use 
a policy response function for the sustainability analysis where primary surplus is 
a function of government debt and the output gap. We show that surplus does not 
respond to an increase in government debt, which cannot be interpreted as sustain-
able. However, primary government surplus increases in expansions and decreases 
in recession, thus being countercyclical and aimed at smoothing business cycles. 
In this respect, the fiscal goals for public debt and deficit set by the Stability and 
Growth Pact may not be enough to ensure fiscal sustainability. More precise fiscal 
rules together with corrective measures would be helpful for both fiscal sustaina-
bility and convergence.
disclosure statement 
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374 aPPendIX
data constructIon and sources
For the convergence analysis, we use data on general government debt, revenues, 
and expenditures. Variables are in millions of euro, current prices. We divide all 
by nominal GDP to express fiscal variables in real terms and in a percent of GDP. 
The main data source is Eurostat and the International Financial Statistics data-
base from the International Monetary Fund. All data span the period from 2000:q1 
to 2017:q2, but some data have been reconstructed. For Germany, Estonia, Ire-
land, and Luxemburg we interpolate annual data for 2000 and 2001 since quar-
terly data start from 2002:q1. For Austria, we interpolate annual data for 2000 
since quarterly data start from 2001:q1. For Croatia, we reconstruct monthly data 
on central government expenditure and revenue based on the old methodology. 
The data are provided by Croatian National Bank (CNB) and we use central gov-
ernment data as a proxy for the general government. Nominal GDP is taken from 
the Eurostat database except for Croatia, Malta, and Poland for which we take the 
data from IFS. Public debt data are entirely taken from the Eurostat database. 
Public debt is usually expressed as a percent of GDP on annual bases. Therefore, 
public debt is divided by a sum of GDP in a current and previous three quarters, 
or , where d
t





are nominal debt and GDP in millions of euro. We use this approach for the 
sustainability analysis when the sample starts in 2002:q1. For the convergence 
analysis where the sample starts in 2000:q1, we divide public debt only by current 






) × 100. For the 
sustainability analysis, we also use primary surplus and real GDP data from Euro-
stat. All the data span the period from 2002:q1 to 2017:q2 (balanced panel). Below 
we plot time series of government revenues and expenditures (figure A1), and 
primary surplus and government debt (figure A2) in a percent of GDP. Table A1 
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377Table a1
Descriptive statistics 
country revenues expenditures debt surplusmean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
Belgium 0.498 0.014 0.519 0.029 102.371 6.191 1.489 2.662
Bulgaria 0.375 0.032 0.378 0.035 25.430 12.762 0.809 3.995
Czech R. 0.397 0.021 0.427 0.030 34.493 6.377 -1.570 2.538
Denmark 0.542 0.012 0.537 0.025 41.284 6.727 2.350 2.937
Germany 0.439 0.011 0.453 0.017 69.791 6.443 0.853 1.749
Estonia 0.380 0.027 0.376 0.035 6.770 2.386 0.605 2.605
Ireland 0.331 0.031 0.374 0.095 63.992 35.900 -3.019 8.925
Greece 0.427 0.042 0.501 0.052 135.084 31.814 -2.996 4.643
Spain 0.380 0.016 0.417 0.035 64.440 24.433 -1.729 4.398
France 0.506 0.016 0.544 0.023 78.400 13.788 -1.601 1.526
Croatia 0.433 0.030 0.478 0.030 56.491 19.248 -1.880 2.281
Italy 0.453 0.019 0.485 0.019 115.085 12.457 1.345 1.277
Cyprus 0.365 0.030 0.395 0.055 73.230 21.307 -0.192 5.510
Latvia 0.352 0.022 0.374 0.036 26.770 14.433 -1.088 3.003
Lithuania 0.341 0.013 0.367 0.039 28.502 10.293 -1.275 3.675
Luxembourg 0.434 0.013 0.418 0.026 14.941 7.215 1.360 1.821
Hungary 0.444 0.021 0.490 0.023 69.585 8.796 -0.745 3.255
Malta 0.384 0.020 0.416 0.023 66.048 4.001 0.266 2.870
Netherlands 0.429 0.009 0.446 0.021 56.298 8.245 -0.165 2.086
Austria 0.489 0.012 0.513 0.019 76.310 6.738 0.363 1.796
Poland 0.395 0.013 0.435 0.018 48.860 5.134 -1.724 1.608
Portugal 0.415 0.021 0.469 0.035 92.343 30.325 -1.906 3.499
Romania 0.335 0.016 0.367 0.033 25.756 10.096 -1.550 3.267
Slovenia 0.434 0.010 0.472 0.048 44.276 22.349 -1.759 4.888
Slovakia 0.373 0.024 0.417 0.039 43.263 8.989 -1.969 2.157
Finland 0.531 0.013 0.520 0.040 46.337 10.241 1.891 3.288
Sweden 0.520 0.019 0.515 0.016 42.539 4.814 1.568 1.730
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